The design of a new passenger ferry’s engine and inadequate follow-on training for engineering crewmembers led to a 2022 fire aboard a Staten Island Ferry, the National Transportation Safety Board said Tuesday.
The fire broke out in the engine room of the passenger ferry Sandy Ground in New York Harbor with 884 persons aboard on Dec. 22, 2022. The crew’s actions to contain and extinguish the fire, combined with a quick response from good Samaritan vessels, resulted in the safe evacuation of all onboard. Damage to the vessel totaled $12.7 million.
As a result of the investigation, NTSB issued a safety alert and five safety recommendations, including recommended regulatory changes to design requirements for diesel engine fuel oil return systems.
While attempting to manage fuel oil levels as the vessel was transiting between Staten Island and Manhattan, oilers aboard the Sandy Ground closed both day tank fuel oil return isolation ball valves, which caused the overpressurization of the fuel oil system. The fuel oil filters on the main engines ruptured, leading to the spray of fuel oil that ignited a fire. A delay in shutting down the main engines led to fuel oil continuing to spray and increased the severity of the fire.
The Sandy Ground was the second of three Ollis-class ferries built for the New York City Department of Transportation and was put into service six months before the fire. The Ollis-class ferries were not originally constructed with fuel oil return isolation valves. Instead, isolation valves were added after delivery to regulate the day tank fuel oil levels. The Ollis-class vessels did not have a means to relieve the pressure in the fuel oil return lines if both fuel oil return isolation valves were closed, and the relief valves in the fuel oil system did not have independent return lines. These design flaws led to the overpressurization.
The NTSB recommended the Coast Guard update marine engineering regulatory requirements to require diesel engine fuel oil return systems on U.S.-flagged vessels be designed to have either unimpeded return flow or a pressure relief valve. Until regulatory requirements can be updated, the NTSB recommends the Coast Guard develop and disseminate design guidance for new construction diesel engine fuel oil return systems to have unimpeded flow from the engine or other arrangements to prevent overpressurization.
The NTSB made a similar recommendation to the American Bureau of Shipping, a classification society that establishes and maintains standards for the construction and operation of ships, to propose the same design requirements to the International Association of Classification Societies.
The NTSB also found the engineering crewmembers were not adequately trained on the fuel system for the new Ollis-class ferries. The crewmembers did not receive follow-on training after fuel oil return isolation ball valves were installed on the Sandy Ground. The new vessels did not have relief valves in their fuel oil return systems like other Staten Island ferries. The crewmembers likely thought the fuel oil system could not be overpressurized as relief valves prevented overpressurization on the other ferries. In addition, the engine room crewmembers on board the Sandy Ground each had a different understanding of the fuel oil system.
The NTSB is issuing a safety alert to vessel operators about the importance of understanding diesel engine fuel oil system return design and operation to prevent overpressurization of fuel oil systems.
The full report is available here.
